Gulf Security Paradoxes: Deterrence, Diplomacy, and the Limits of the Old Security Order

As Iran increasingly challenges the remnants of the Pax Americana era through asymmetric warfare tactics and efforts to project influence over strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab, Gulf security, in its broadest sense, can no longer be understood solely through the lens of conventional military balances. Rather, it has become contingent upon the ability of Gulf states to address a complex array of irregular threats that transcend borders and established international norms, while developing the deterrence, resilience, and diplomatic mechanisms needed to prevent recurring crises from degenerating into a persistent state of “no-war, no-peace.”

This paper is premised on the argument that Iran’s hostile actions have not brought an end to the US role in the Gulf; instead, they have exposed the limitations of a security architecture that relied predominantly on Washington. Consequently, the central question is no longer whether Gulf states will dispense with the US security guarantee, but rather how that guarantee can be recalibrated within a broader strategic framework — one that integrates collective defense, diversified partnerships, the protection of maritime corridors, and the pursuit of more sustainable political understandings with Iran.

Although the US security guarantee remains essential to Gulf security, it is no longer sufficient on its own to address the region’s evolving threat landscape (CENTCOM)

The End of an Era
Analysts generally view Pax Americana as having reached its zenith in 1991, following the liberation of Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The regional order rested on three pillars: US military predominance, Washington’s partnerships with the six Arab Gulf countries, and the dollar-denominated oil trade. The current Iran war may mark the beginning of a profound transformation, the contours of which have been emerging for years.

Iran’s escalating challenge to the remnants of the Pax Americana order threatens to push the Middle East into a new security era — one that is distinct from the regional security architecture established by the United States in the 1990s. Yet, no viable alternative has emerged. Neither global powers such as China, Europe, or Russia nor regional actors such as Israel, Türkiye, or Pakistan have demonstrated the capacity or willingness to establish and lead a new regional order.

Despite these challenges, Tehran appears to overestimate its ability to end US influence in the region, sustain aggressive policies toward its Gulf neighbors without incurring significant costs, and exercise unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz. The prevailing balance of power continues to place substantial constraints on such ambitions.

At the same time, there are few objective indicators to suggest that Iran will cease to be one of the region’s central powers. Consequently, any emerging Gulf order is likely to place relations with Tehran at its core — whether those relations are based on coexistence, managed competition, or cooperation. The nature of these ties and the frameworks governing them will be central to any post-war regional restructuring.

Iran lacks the capacity to exercise unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz — and should not be allowed to do so (AFP)

The Iran War and the Need for New Understandings
Iran’s aggression against its Arab neighbors has exposed the limits of the long-standing approach that has governed Gulf-Iranian relations — an approach premised on the assumption that de-escalation, containment, and conflict management were sufficient to regulate relations with Tehran. The 2026 war demonstrated that de-escalation is unsustainable without credible deterrence, and that diplomacy is most effective when supported by robust defensive capacities and institutional mechanisms capable of reducing strategic vulnerabilities. The conflict also highlighted a fundamental strategic paradox in Gulf security: although the region is heavily armed, it still lacks an integrated collective defense architecture and the institutional mechanisms required to break the recurring cycle of “no-war, no-peace.”

In the UAE’s assessment, the war — coupled with the erosion of the existing regional security architecture — underscores the need for new understandings. These should extend beyond merely preventing military escalation to encompass agreed rules governing maritime corridors, energy pipelines, critical infrastructure protection, and the use of proxies and other irregular tools of influence. However, such understandings are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to take the form of a collective Gulf-wide arrangement with Iran. Tehran is expected to continue favoring bilateral or limited arrangements with Gulf states rather than dealing with the GCC as a cohesive political and security bloc.

This reality does not diminish the UAE’s broader strategic interpretation of the crisis as both a test of the adaptability of Emirati and Gulf economies and an opportunity to build a more diversified network of ports, trade routes, and energy transport corridors. The objective extends beyond simply overcoming the repercussions of the Strait of Hormuz crisis. It is also intended to redefine the UAE’s position on the global trade map by ensuring that the alternatives developed during the crisis become permanent components of a more resilient economic system that is better equipped to withstand future shocks and disruptions.

While efforts to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz — through existing, expanded, or newly developed alternative routes — carry considerable strategic value, their long-term success will depend on effective diplomatic support. In this context, a non-aggression pact emerges as a practical necessity for restoring regional stability and reducing the risk of future escalation. Although the UAE has successfully intercepted the majority of Iranian missile and drone attacks, threat perceptions remain elevated given the persistence of regional tensions. Official UAE-Iran engagement on the sidelines of the September 12-13 BRICS summit in New Delhi may signal the opening of a de-escalatory diplomatic track. Nevertheless, unless Tehran demonstrates a genuine willingness to end hostilities and revise its current regional approach, the underlying sources of instability are likely to endure.

Gulf Cooperation and Building Collective Capability
Despite intra-Gulf differences, political pragmatism requires GCC states to seriously pursue the development of integrated collective early-warning systems. This calls for deeper operational coordination in air and missile defense, maritime surveillance, cybersecurity, and crisis communication, alongside greater integration of defense procurement policies and the advancement of indigenous defense-industrial capabilities. Together, these measures constitute a fundamental pillar of regional resilience, no less important than forging balanced and sustainable political understandings across the Gulf, developing alternatives to vulnerable strategic chokepoints, bolstering national defense capabilities, and expanding the tools available for strategic flexibility.

The current Iran conflict has highlighted a significant paradox: even as the Gulf’s strategic importance to the global economy and great-power competition continues to grow, the region remains highly vulnerable to instability and geopolitical tensions. Consequently, Gulf states are increasingly preoccupied with a dual reality: rising geopolitical relevance on the one hand and persistent exposure to fundamental security and defense threats on the other. Against the backdrop of ongoing regional conflict, these states are working to mitigate their vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience. Yet, the persistence of such risks raises broader questions about the extent to which the Gulf’s growing strategic importance is matched by adequate security guarantees and institutional safeguards within an increasingly fragmented international order and a Middle East undergoing profound transformation.

The strengthening of Gulf defense and deterrence capabilities does not require Gulf states to adopt a predominantly military approach, nor does it imply the militarization of regional policy. Despite the economic repercussions of the war, the trade, investment and business sectors remained largely resilient. Indeed, Gulf economies gained valuable experience in absorbing severe shocks and pressures, thereby strengthening their strategic resilience and reinforcing international confidence in their ability to withstand regional instability.

Recognizing the region’s vulnerabilities should not be mistaken for a loss of confidence in Gulf economies. On the contrary, it underscores the importance of managing these vulnerabilities more effectively and investing in mechanisms that strengthen long-term resilience. The conflict also exposed the shortcomings of Iranian calculations. Tehran sought to impose significant economics costs on Gulf states by disrupting trade flows and energy connectivity with global markets, using regional instability as a means of exerting pressure on both the United States and the broader international economy. In effect, Iran attempted to convert its capacity for destruction into a capacity for strategic disruption. Yet despite the disruptions and damage caused by the conflict, this objective ultimately fell short, as Gulf economies demonstrated a greater degree of adaptability and resilience than Tehran had anticipated.

Resetting the Gulf-US Partnership
The significance of the American security guarantee to the Gulf states becomes particularly evident during periods of crisis. Nevertheless, recent events have demonstrated that reliance on this guarantee alone is insufficient to prevent all forms of Iranian aggression. A central paradox has emerged: the United States remains the Gulf’s principal security guarantor, but its presence is no longer sufficient by itself to manage an environment in which asymmetric capabilities, drones, missiles, and cyber threats can disrupt even highly advanced defense systems. At the same time, it is evident that without the Gulf states’ own defensive capabilities and close cooperation with the United States, the consequences of the Iranian attacks would have been considerably more severe.

Consequently, the prospect of reducing or fundamentally reassessing the US military presence in the Gulf, despite Iran’s repeated claims that it serves as the principal justification for its attacks on neighboring states, is not currently under serious consideration by Gulf states. This reflects a growing recognition that strategic partnerships and security guarantees should not be evaluated through an absolute lens. Rather, they are best understood as relative arrangements whose effectiveness depends on burden-sharing, complementary capabilities, and evolving regional conditions. In this context, the US military has stated that it does not intend to withdraw from the region despite Iranian attacks on US bases in the Gulf and Jordan.

However, the United States is likely to reconfigure its Gulf security architecture. The model, historically built around large military bases, forward deployments, and conventional superiority, has proven more vulnerable than previously assumed. As a result, Washington is likely to move toward fewer, less visible bases, more dispersed deployments, stronger precision-strike and missile-defense capabilities, and greater use of artificial intelligence, while preserving its overall conventional military superiority. Britain and France are also likely to expand defense cooperation with Gulf monarchies and increase arms sales, thereby complementing rather than replacing the US security role.

As the Gulf states continue to expand and diversify their strategic partnerships, Asia is emerging as an increasingly pivotal and indispensable economic partner. No other region can match the scale of Asia’s economic importance to the Gulf, whether in terms of investment flows, trade, or long-term commercial ties. This reality gives rise to another strategic paradox: the Gulf’s economic center of gravity is shifting increasingly toward Asia, while its principal security guarantees remain rooted in the West. Whether this gap between economic and security relationships narrows over time will be a critical factor shaping the future of Gulf security and the broader transformation of its strategic environment.

This question acquires additional significance in light of Iran’s apparent effort to develop new instruments for influence and coercion through its ability to threaten vital maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab, thereby expanding its means of exerting pressure beyond its traditional reliance on regional proxy networks.

The establishment of new understandings for Gulf security is no longer a matter of choice, but a strategic necessity for managing a period of regional transition (Shutterstock)

The lessons of the Iran war underscore the need for a recalibration of security and defense responsibilities among regional countries and external powers. However, enhancing strategic resilience and strengthening domestic defense capabilities should not be equated with achieving self-sufficiency. Rather, the objective is to reduce exposure to vulnerabilities and develop backup systems that mitigate risks across defense, transportation and trade routes, supply chains, and strategic reserves. In this regard, diversified partnerships, whether bilateral or multilateral, remain essential to strengthening national and regional capabilities.

This evolving reality does not necessarily point to a decline in the US role in the Gulf. Instead, it suggests a gradual adjustment in the nature, scope, and modalities of US engagement, while preserving the depth and strategic significance of the Gulf-American partnership. For more than a decade, the Gulf states have pursued policies aimed at diversifying their strategic options and hedging against both fluctuations in US regional commitments and the challenges posed by Iran. The Gulf states do not share a uniform view of how best to respond to the anticipated erosion of the US regional role, and the issue remains a subject of continuing debate. Nevertheless, there is broad recognition of the need to prepare for the gradual emergence of a new regional security framework. The most difficult question, as Time has noted, is determining the point at which diversification ceases to function merely as a hedging strategy and begins to evolve into an independent security framework.

Summary and Conclusions
The Iran war did not immediately result in the collapse of the established Gulf security paradigm; rather, it exposed its underlying limitations and accelerated demands for adaptation. The US security guarantee remains indispensable, yet it requires recalibration. Iran will remain a central regional actor that cannot be ignored, but it cannot be permitted to impose unilateral rules governing security or freedom of navigation. The Gulf states, for their part, must now combine deterrence and diplomacy, strengthen their own capabilities, and broaden their network of strategic partnerships.

In this context, the concept of “deterrence and diplomacy” appears particularly well suited to the requirements of the next phase. Deterrence is necessary to prevent geography, strategic corridors, and proxy networks from being transformed into instruments of coercion, while diplomacy remains essential for establishing balanced and durable understandings across both shores of the Gulf. At the same time, collective defense mechanisms, economic flexibility, alternative transportation corridors, secure supply chains, and strategic reserve capacities must be integrated into a comprehensive framework aimed at reducing the region’s exposure to crises and shocks.

Accordingly, the development of new understandings for Gulf security is no longer merely an option but a strategic imperative. Managing the emerging transitional period requires frameworks capable of addressing the intersection of regional and international dynamics, military and economic considerations, and deterrence and political accommodation. Ultimately, the success of any future security architecture will depend on its ability to transform the Gulf’s enduring paradoxes from sources of vulnerability into foundations of institutional strength. Only then will the region be less susceptible to external disruptions and better positioned to shape, rather than merely adapt to, the foundations of its own security order.

Note: This paper was originally published in Arabic on October 24, 2026.

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